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CONFLICT OF LAWS INTERNATIONAL TORT CASES:  
The Need for Reform on Both Sides of the Tasman 
by 
Anthony Gray*
 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of which law to apply to resolve a tort case comprising elements from more 
than one jurisdiction is not an easy one to decide.  Many different approaches have been 
tried and discarded by the courts.  Some approaches provide for a general rule but include 
a flexible exception.  Others provide for a completely flexible test.  This article traces the 
Australian courts’ latest attempts to deal with the matter, and documents recent 
developments in England, Canada and New Zealand.  Reference is made to the vast 
North American jurisprudence in this area, in particular interest analysis, to suggest the 
way forward for Australian and New Zealand courts in this area, with a view to 
maintaining some flexibility in approach, while applying the law of the place of the 
wrong as the primary test. The author commends the High Court of Australia’s (belated) 
rejection of the double actionability test and suggests that New Zealand might also 
consider rejecting that approach. However, it is submitted the Australian High Court 
should adopt a flexible exception, as have the courts in other countries, including New 
Zealand and Canada. 
 
The Australian High Court in Regie National des Usines Renault SA v Zhang1 (Renault) 
and John Pfeiffer Pty Limited v Rogerson2 (Pfeiffer), after alluding to dissatisfaction with 
its previous double actionability approach in this area, 3  decided upon an apparently 
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1 (2002) 210 CLR 491. 
2 (2000) 203 CLR 503. 
3 As to which, refer to Peter Nygh ‘The Miraculous Raising of Lazarus:  McKain v Miller and Co (South 
Australia) Pty Ltd’ (1992) 22 University of Western Australia Law Review 386, 394; Michael Pryles ‘Of 
Limitations and Torts and the Logic of Courts’ (1992) 18 Melbourne University Law Review 676; Michael 
Pryles ‘The Law Applicable to Interstate Torts: Farewell to Phillips v Eyre?’ (1989) 63 Australian Law 
Journal 158,181; Brian Opeskin ‘Conflict of Laws and the Quantification of Damages in Tort’ (1992) 14 
Sydney Law Review 340; Australian Law Reform Commission Choice of Law (1992) No 58, 10.13, 10.41; 
Anthony Gray ‘Conflict of Laws – Heading in the Wrong Direction?’ (1994) 24 Queensland Law Society 
Journal 357.  Much of the jurisprudence in this area has been influenced, at least until recently, by the so-
called rule in Phillips v Eyre (1870) 6 LR QB 1, 28-29 that in order to bring an action in one country for a 
wrong committed abroad, ‘the wrong must be of such a character that it would have been actionable if 
committed in (the country where the action was brought) … secondly the act must not have been justifiable 
simple choice of law rule in tort for both international and interstate Australian choice of 
law conflicts.  The court decided that, generally, the law of the place of the wrong should 
be applied as the choice of law rule.  This was the choice that eventually commended 
itself to the majority.  The court noted this approach reflects community expectations as 
to the law to be applied,4 and was in most cases easy to apply.  Citizens understood that if 
they went to another jurisdiction, they would be subject to the rules and regulations of 
that jurisdiction.  Liability would generally be fixed and certain.5  Under this approach, 
liability was fixed by reference to geography, making it easier to promote laws that gave 
a favourable outcome.6  The rule was simple to apply and led to certain results.7  The 
court noted however, that in some cases, it may be difficult to ascertain the ‘place of the 
wrong’.8   
 
The author has previously argued against the double actionability rule on the basis that 
giving primacy to the law of the forum only encourages forum shopping.  It is hard to 
justify today, if ever it were justifiable, why the forum law should have to recognize the 
action in order for it to proceed in the jurisdiction.  There is no general reason why a 
forum court cannot apply the substantive law of another country, except perhaps in the 
very unusual case where the foreign law is offensive to public policy.9  Why should 
forum law be applied, in cases where all or most of the links (or connective factors) are 
with the place of the wrong?  As a result, the author would generally commend the High 
Court’s recent moves towards adopting the law of the place of the wrong as the general 
rule to be applied.  This move is consistent with moves in the United Kingdom and 
                                                                                                                                                 
by the law of the place where it was done’.  This single comment has had a remarkable influence on choice 
of law rules for torts conflicts throughout the common law world.   
4 Pfeiffer, supra n 2 at 540.  At least one legal philosopher would agree – since Locke thought that citizens 
agreed to bind themselves to the law of the jurisdiction they lived in by their presence within the 
jurisdiction, he would logically agree that if a citizen traveled to another jurisdiction, they would be 
deemed to have agreed to submit themselves to the laws of that jurisdiction by virtue of their presence:  
John Locke Second Treatise of Government (1690) 119. 
5 (539); similar reasoning appears in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson v Jensen 
[1994] 3 SCR 1022, 1050-1051.  However the New York Court of Appeals in Babcock v Jackson (1963) 12 
NY 2d 473, 191 NE 2d 279, 281 commented that ‘despite the advantages of certainty, ease of application 
and predictability which it affords, there has in recent years been increasing criticism of the traditional rule 
(ie law of the place of the wrong) by commentators and a judicial trend towards its abandonment or 
modification … (because) the theory ignores the interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort 
occurred may have in the resolution of particular issues’.  
6 Pfeiffer, supra n 2 at 539. 
7 This decision was confirmed by the High Court in Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 
CLR 575. 
8 Pfeiffer, supra n 2 at 538; a recent example is Dow Jones, involving an action for defamation brought by a 
Victorian resident in a Victorian court in respect of material uploaded in the United States.  The High Court 
found that Victoria, being the place of publication, was the place of the wrong in this case, but that every 
place in which the material was published and in which the plaintiff’s reputation suffered as a result was 
also a place of the wrong.  As a result, the plaintiff could bring suit in each jurisdiction in which his 
reputation had been affected by the defamatory statements; cf Cuccioli v Jekyll and Hyde Neue Metropol 
Bremen Theater Produktion GMBH and Co (2001) 150 F Supp 2d 566, involving the unauthorized use of 
the plaintiff’s likeness to promote a CD advertised on a website created and maintained in Germany, 
although accessible in the United States.  The court found the wrong had occurred in Germany. 
9 The High Court in Pfeiffer gave many reasons for its abandonment of the double actionability approach. 
Canada.  The law of New Zealand is being increasingly isolated worldwide in its 
adherence to the Phillips v Eyre approach. 
II  THE FLEXIBLE EXCEPTION AND QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
In judgments and/or legislation in other countries, different approaches have been taken 
to the question of a so-called flexible exception to the general rule, as well as the content 
of the general rule.  In the United Kingdom, some members of the House of Lords, 
having accepted the general rule was as Willes J said in Phillips v Eyre,10 considered a 
so-called flexible exception to the rule.  Referring to similar provisions in the Second 
American Restatement supporting such an approach, Lord Wilberforce declared 
 
I think that the necessary flexibility can be obtained through segregation of the 
relevant issue and consideration whether, in relation to that issue, the foreign rule 
ought as a matter of policy … to be applied.  For this purpose, it is necessary to 
identify the policy of the rule, to inquire to what situations, with what contacts, it 
was intended to apply; whether not to apply it … would serve any interest the 
rule was devised to meet.11
 
Although not all Lords agreed with such a formulation, it was later unanimously adopted 
by the Privy Council in Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA12.  Later codification of 
United Kingdom law in this area also recognized that a flexible exception applies to the 
general rule.13
 
This has also been the case in Canada, where the Supreme Court reconsidered the issue in 
Tolofson v Jensen.14  While favouring the inflexible application of the law of the place of 
the wrong in that case, La Forest J took a different view of international torts conflicts: 
 
Because a rigid rule on the international level could give rise to injustice, in certain 
circumstances, I am not averse to retaining discretion in the court to apply our own law to 
deal with such circumstances 
 
Similarly, recent cases in New Zealand have allowed a flexible exception to apply, where 
one country has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties.  In 
that case, the law of that country is to be applied.  For example, in Baxter v RMC Group 
PLC,15  the court found that although prima facie the law of New Zealand would be 
applied to resolve the case, the facts called for the application of British law, given that 
the wrong/s had occurred in Great Britain.  New Zealand also continues to apply the 
                                                 
10 Phillips, supra n 3 at 28-29. 
11 Chaplin v Boys [1971] AC 356, 391; to like effect Lord Hodson (378) and Lord Pearson (406) 
12 [1995] AC 190, 206; confirmed more recently in Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraq Airways Company 
and Others [2002] UKHL 19. 
13 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 s12 (the legislation also changes the 
general rule away from double actionability to the primacy of the law of the place of the wrong). 
14 [1994] SCR 1022; see generally Unifund Assurance Co v Insurance Corp of British Columbia [2003] 2 
SCR 63 and Wong v Wei (1999) 65 BCLR (3d) 222. 
15 [2003] 1 NZLR 304; see also Kunzang v Gershwin Hotel (High Court, Auckland, 19/9/2000) and 
Starlink Navigation Ltd v The Ship ‘Seven Pioneer’ (2001) 16 PRNZ 55 where the court applied the double 
actionability approach. 
Phillips v Eyre rule, on the basis of double actionability.  If both limbs are satisfied, the 
law of the forum is the prima facie rule to be applied in that country.16
 
One also refers to the American Law Institute’s Second Restatement, which avoids a 
presumption in favour of either law, but instead requires application of whatever law has 
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.  Various factors are 
listed to be taken into account, including the place where the injury occurred, the place 
where the conduct causing the injury occurred, the residence and nationality of the parties, 
and the place where the relationship between the parties, if any, is centred.  Relevant 
policies of the forum and other interested States are also relevant.17
 
The flexible exception has also appealed to former members of the High Court of 
Australia.  For example in Breavington v Godleman18 and other cases, adoption of the 
law of the place of the wrong as the primary rule has been accompanied for some judges 
by what may be termed a ‘flexible exception’, as it was described in Chaplin v Boys per 
Lord Wilberforce.19  This exception might apply where the place of the wrong is in some 
sense fortuitous.20   
 
However, in Pfeiffer the court rejected a flexible exception, at least in cases involving 
intra-Australian torts.  Their conclusion was that: 
 
[A]dopting any flexible rule or exception to a universal rule would require the 
closest attention to identifying what criteria are to be used to make the choice of 
law.  Describing the flexible rule in terms such as “real and substantial” or “most 
significant” connection with the jurisdiction will not give sufficient guidance to 
courts, to parties, or to those like insurers who must order their affairs on the 
basis of predictions about the future application of the rule.  What emerges very 
clearly from the United States experience in those States where the proper law of 
the tort theory has been adopted is that it has led to very great uncertainty.  That 
can only increase the cost to parties, insurers and society at large.21   
 
                                                 
16 The emphasis on the law of the forum as the choice of law after applying the Phillips test as a double 
actionability rule is reminiscent of the High Court’s decisions in Koop v Bebb (1951) 84 CLR 629 and 
McKain v Miller (1992). 
17 s6, s145 
18 (1988) 169 CLR 41. 
19 Interestingly, a flexible exception was also applied by State Courts, for example Warren v Warren [1972] 
QdR 386. Matthews J applied Queensland law to litigation relating to a car accident that happened in New 
South Wales.  Both parties were Queensland resident – the judge allowed the claim although they would 
have been statute barred in New South Wales, holding there was flexibility in the Phillips rule.  A similar 
result occurred in Corcoran v Corcoran [1974] VR 164, allowing one Victorian resident to sue another 
Victorian resident in relation to an accident occurring in New South Wales. 
20 Chaplin, supra n 11 at 389, per Lord Wilberforce:  ‘to fix the liability of two or more persons according 
to a locality with which they may have no more connection than a temporary accidental and perhaps 
unintended presence may lead to an unjust result’, accepted in Breavington by Mason CJ at page 76 and 
Toohey J at page 162.   It has also been applied to justify the exclusive application of the law of the place 
of the wrong: Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA [1995] 1 AC 190. 
21 Pfeiffer, supra n 2 at 538. 
The court reconsidered the issue of the flexible exception, in relation to international torts, 
in the Renault case.  Given the strenuous reasoning above for rejecting any flexibility in 
respect of intra-national torts, one might have expected the court to take the same 
approach as it took in Pfeiffer, rejecting (entirely) the so-called exception for the reasons 
above.  The court did not do so.  The court certainly made it clear that the choice of law 
rule was to be the law of the place of the wrong, without any resort to a flexible exception: 
 
The submission … is that the reasoning and conclusion in Pfeiffer that the 
substantive law for the determination of rights and liabilities in respect of intra-
Australian torts is the (law of the place of the wrong) should be extended to 
foreign torts, despite the absence of the significant factor of federal 
considerations, and that this should be without the addition of any “flexible 
exception”.  That submission should be accepted.22
 
However, after considering the Canadian Supreme Court’s Tolofson decision taking a 
similar approach, the court added the following comment:  
 
Questions which might be caught up in the application of a “flexible exception” 
to a choice of law rule fixing upon the (law of the place of the wrong) in practice 
may often be subsumed in the issues presented on a stay application, including 
one based on public policy grounds.23
 
Kirby J preferred to reserve the question whether there was a flexible exception in 
relation to international torts, but held the exception did exist.  He referred to the 
majority’s linking of public policy arguments with the flexible exception, but noted that 
Chaplin v Boys, where the exception was applied by some judges, was not a case where 
public policy could have been raised as an argument.24
 
The approach in the joint judgment suggests that the court sees the role of the flexible 
exception as relating more to jurisdiction, rather than the choice of law to be applied to 
resolve the dispute.  However, this approach was specifically rejected by Toohey J in 
                                                 
22 Renault, supra n 1 at 520. 
23 Ibid, 519.  This approach has been discarded in the United Kingdom.  Writing in 1989 (i.e. pre-legislative 
reform in the United Kingdom) of a case brought in a United Kingdom court involving elements of a tort 
committed both in that jurisdiction and New York, Fentiman made the comments:  ‘[The decision] … 
confirms the suspicion that substantive tortious conflicts will seldom arise in England because such 
disputes can be disposed of at the jurisdictional stage.  First, the case emphasizes how the likely substantive 
outcome of a dispute can govern questions of jurisdiction, turning as it did on the plaintiffs’ need to 
establish a good arguable case against the defendants.  Second, it confirms the tendency to regard the courts 
of the place where a tort is (substantially) committed as the forum conveniens .. The theoretical importance 
of this tendency is that it casts further doubt on the scope of the forum conveniens doctrine generally’:  
Richard Fentiman ‘Torts – Jurisdiction or Choice of Law?’ [1989] Cambridge Law Journal 191,193.  
This approach was abandoned six years later when the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, which provided for the primary of the law of the 
place of the wrong (where the most significant elements of the facts constituting the tort occurred or the 
law of the place of injury in cases of personal injury), subject to a flexible exception where it would be 
“substantially more appropriate” for the issues to be resolved by another law (emphasis added, and note the 
provision does not state that the exception will apply where it is substantially more appropriate for the 
issues to be resolved by another court, as the questions are, although related, distinct). 
24 Renault, supra n 1 at 535. 
Breavington. 25   Moreover, when it was originally conceived in Chaplin v Boys, the 
‘flexible exception’ was used as part of the process of deciding which law to be applied, 
i.e. it was a choice of law rule, and not a matter only of jurisdiction.  If the parties had a 
merely incidental connection with the place of the wrong, its law was not be applied on 
policy grounds.  Lord Wilberforce’s double actionability test in Chaplin26 was subject to 
a flexible exception based on ‘an account of the varying interests and considerations of 
policy which may arise when one or more foreign elements are present.’27  The Supreme 
Court of Canada itself applies the flexible test not merely to questions of jurisdiction, but 
to the choice of law question,28 as do the New Zealand courts.29
 
If, contrary to the experience in all other common law jurisdictions, the High Court of 
Australia continues in future to view public policy arguments as going to jurisdiction 
only, it should clarify in what circumstances it would permit a stay of proceedings based 
on public policy grounds.  The High Court in Renault mentioned the inherent jurisdiction 
of a court to stay proceedings brought before it for various reasons, including that the 
forum is ‘inappropriate’.30  This has been interpreted narrowly in Australia to mean if 
continuation of the proceedings in that court would be oppressive, in the sense of 
‘seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging, or vexatious, in the sense of 
productive of serious and unjustified trouble or harassment’.31  The ends of justice were 
paramount.  One relevant factor was whether the substantive law of the forum was the 
law of the cause (ie in this context, the law of the place of the wrong).  Another was the 
presence of connecting factors between the plaintiff or the defendant, and the forum 
jurisdiction. 
 
So, with respect, arguably the precise scope of the flexible exception in relation to 
conflict of laws in tort is unclear.32  The High Court has said it does not apply to intra-
                                                 
25 Supra n 18 at 171. ‘The argument on behalf of the appellant that if the forum chosen by him is not the 
natural or appropriate forum, his action may be stayed, is not sufficient.  The question is not one of forum 
non conveniens;  it is more deeply rooted than that.’  
26 391.  This approach has been adopted at common law by the Privy Council in Red Sea and by the House 
of Lords in Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company [2002] UKHL 19 
27 This is also the sense in which the ‘proper law’ exception is used in the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK), as a question going to the choice of law rather than jurisdiction. 
28 Unifund Assurance Co v Insurance Corp of British Columbia [2003] 2 SCR 63 
29 The law is as stated by O’Regan J in Baxter v RMC Group PLC [2003] 1 NZLR 304, 318: 
(a) a tort is actionable in New Zealand only if it is actionable both in New Zealand and England.  If 
this rule (the double actionability rule) is satisfied, then the substantive law to be applied is the law 
of New Zealand; 
(b) However, if one country has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the 
parties, the substantive law of that country is to be applied 
30 The High Court’s approach on forum questions has not escaped criticism from the experts.  See for 
example Peter Nygh and Martin Davies Conflict of Laws in Australia 7th edition (2002) 129, criticizing the 
Voth decision as out of step with other countries in the Commonwealth, encouraging of forum shopping, 
and internally inconsistent. 
31 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538. 
32 Others might suggest that the High Court in Pfeiffer and Renault have unequivocally precluded any 
exception in relation to the choice of tort law, though acknowledging the flexibility of courts in application 
of forum non conveniens.  The Court did reject application of a flexible exception.  This author argues the 
position remains open because of the High Court’s comment in Renault, supra n 1 at 519 that ‘questions 
Australian torts.  In relation to international torts, the Court says it does not apply to the 
choice of law decision, but relates to arguments about jurisdiction.  Given that this is not 
how the exception was conceived by Lord Wilberforce in Chaplin v Boys, how it is now 
written in British legislation, or in the United States where it has been tied into the debate 
about the proper law of the tort (i.e. in relation to a decision about choice of law not 
jurisdiction), nor how it is applied in New Zealand, there is little support for this 
approach, other than dicta in one Canadian Supreme Court decision.  This of itself does 
not mean it is incorrect, but it is suggested the High Court should elaborate on the reasons 
for its approach, acknowledge its departure from the United States and English 
jurisprudence in the area, and explain precisely how, as it has suggested, ‘public policy’ 
is relevant to questions of jurisdiction.   
 
 
III  WHERE THE PLACE OF THE WRONG IS FORTUITOUS OR INCIDENTAL 
 
Adapting the facts of Chaplin v Boys, assume that two Australian soldiers were involved 
in a collision while driving in Malta.  Both soldiers had been stationed there temporarily.  
Assume the law in Malta regarding personal injuries remains materially different from 
the law in Australia.  If an action were brought in an Australian court in respect of the 
accident, what is the Australian court to do?  Should it: 
 
(a) hear the action and apply the now-accepted general rule that the law of the 
place of the wrong (here Malta) should apply 
(b) decline to hear the action because an Australian court is a ‘clearly 
inappropriate forum’ (as we have seen, the Court has said one relevant 
factor here is which substantive law is to be applied – here it would be 
Maltese.  If the parties are Australian citizens, it is difficult to say that an 
Australian court is ‘clearly inappropriate’) 
(c) hear the action, but discard the now-accepted general rule that the law of 
the place of the wrong should apply, on the basis of public policy 
arguments that Australia has a closer connection with the parties, so 
Australian law should apply.33 
 
Based on what the High Court said in Renault, the third possibility could be discarded.  
The Court did not see the flexible exception as relating to the question of choice of law.  
Given that the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test is such a difficult one to satisfy, one 
would think it likely that the first possibility would be the most likely outcome. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
which might be caught up in the application of a ‘flexible exception’ to a choice of law rule fixing upon the 
lex loci delicti in practice may often be subsumed in the issues presented on a stay application, including 
one based on public policy grounds’.   The author believes this statement is an important one, in that the 
High Court recognizes its power to invoke public policy considerations as a basis for declining to exercise 
jurisdiction. 
33 This approach would apparently be supported by the decisions of Lord Wilberforce in Chaplin, Mason 
CJ in Breavington, and the United States decision of Babcock v Jackson 
How does the High Court’s ‘public-policy-in-the-context-of-jurisdiction’ test apply here, 
if at all?  Is this the kind of case where an Australian court might, on the grounds of 
public policy, refuse to hear the action because an Australian court is a clearly 
inappropriate forum?34  It has been noted that this is a very difficult test to satisfy, so 
arguably not, at least according to participants in the joint judgment in Renault.  The 
position of Kirby J is more equivocal.  He considered the arguments in favour of and 
against a flexible exception, concluding that he would rather leave the question whether 
to recognize a flexible exception “where the law of the foreign jurisdiction is such as to 
justify an Australian court’s declining to recognize or enforce the law of that place” 
(emphasis added).  He reiterated: 
 
The general rule is that stated in Pfeiffer.  In international torts, there is an 
exception to the application of that general rule.  That exception may be invoked 
by reference to public policy considerations that would make the enforcement by 
the forum of the law of the place of the wrong contrary to the public policy of the 
forum.35
 
In commenting on the majority’s opinion that questions of public policy would often in 
practice be subsumed on questions of forum non conveniens, he said this ‘need not be so’.  
He referred to the situation in Chaplin v Boys as one case, where the flexible exception 
applied and the law of the place of the wrong did not apply.  This was not because 
application of Maltese law was contrary to public policy.  These comments by Kirby J 
suggest that his Honour would consider arguments about public policy as going to the 
choice of law (as Lord Wilberforce did in Chaplin), rather than a question of jurisdiction 
only.  It is acknowledged, however, that Kirby J expressly reserves the question for a 
future time.   
 
To further support Kirby J’s observations, consider how the High Court would handle the 
facts of Kuwait Airways Corporation (KAC) v Iraqi Airways Company (IAC),36 with 
some variations. The actual facts involved the confiscation by an Iraq government of 
property owned by KAC in Kuwait.  The government eventually gave them to IAC.  
KAC sought the return of their aircraft, suing for the tort of conversion.  If we assumed 
that KAC was an Iraq-based company, all of the links involve Iraq – the place of the 
wrong and the place of residence of both parties, so this would not created many 
difficulties. 
                                                 
34 Canadian scholars are skeptical.  In “Back to the Future!  Is the New Rigid Choice of Law Rule for 
Interprovincial Torts Constitutionallly Mandated?” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 35, 69 Jacqueline 
Castel asks:  ‘Can the doctrine of forum non conveniens really play a significant role as a substitute for 
actionability by the law of the forum or publicy policy if the forum is the most appropriate forum or the 
natural forum?  Consider the case where the cause of action created by the law of the place of the wrong is 
not known to the forum but both parties are resident or domiciled in the forum.  In such a case the court 
cannot declare itself forum non conveniens.  It must take jurisdiction and apply the law of the place of the 
wrong to the exclusion of the law of the forum … Only where the forum is not connected with the action, 
that is, not the appropriate jurisdiction based on all relevant factors, could it declare itself forum non 
conveniens.’ 
35  Renault, supra n 1 at 535.  Another discussion of policy issues occurs in J J Fawcett, ‘Policy 
Considerations in Tort Choice of Law’ [1984] Modern Law Review 650. 
36 [2002] UKHL 19. 
 
However, assume that KAC was actually based in Australia, so there was a substantive 
link between Australia and the matter.  Would the High Court now still be able to decline 
to hear the matter on the basis of forum non conveniens?  How would the majority apply 
its test? 
 
Questions which might be caught up in the application of a “flexible exception” to a 
choice of law rule fixing upon the (law of the place of the wrong) in practice may often 
be subsumed in the issues presented on a stay application, including one based on public 
policy grounds 
 
It is submitted that in order to apply this test to avoid the application of Iraqi law (which 
would justify the confiscation) the High Court would have to strain the ‘clearly 
inappropriate forum’ test to try to argue that Australia had no connection to and thus 
should not hear the matter.  But this doesn’t really solve the problem – surely the correct 
result is that while we have no problem in an Australian court hearing the matter, the 
Australian court should decline to apply Iraqi law on the basis of public policy.  (This is 
in fact the result achieved by the House of Lords in applying the flexible exception to the 
facts.)  It is submitted the High Court of Australia would find it very difficult to come up 
with the same result by applying the awkward test is postulated in the Regie case, and this 
is reason for the court to re-think its opposition to a flexible exception choice of law rule. 
 
The question of the use of policy then is debatable, and it is submitted, with respect, that 
the court needs to clarify its use of ‘public policy’.37  Again, it is acknowledged that the 
majority of the High Court in Renault indicated support of the then Canadian line that 
public policy is relevant only to questions of jurisdiction.  However, given the Canadian 
courts’ since-expanded use of policy considerations to include choice of law, given 
policy as used in the United Kingdom has been somewhat broader, the view of some 
High Court judges (at different times, Toohey, Mason and Kirby JJ) that policy is 
relevant to choice of law questions, and the turbulent history of this area of the law, it is 
considered possible that a future High Court may consider policy arguments in relation to 
the choice of law question, rather than merely jurisdiction.  Of the current members, at 
least Kirby J would apparently support this expansion.38
                                                 
37 For the High Court’s difficulties with policy issues recently in the context of recovery for personal injury, 
see for example Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243, Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180 and 
Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 199 ALR 131.  A detailed study of this jurisprudence is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but they are included as an example of differences among the Court as to the use of policy in 
deciding negligence cases.  Most recently, Callinan J in Cattanach, at page 209, called for judges to be 
explicit if they were deciding negligence claims based on policy, rather than explain decisions on other 
grounds. 
38 Discussion of the distinction between substance and procedure is considered to be beyond the scope of 
this paper.  However, one should note that policy considerations have also been considered relevant in 
making this distinction.  For example, New York courts have classified statutes prohibiting recovery for 
wrongful death as procedural, and refused to apply them to suits brought in New York based on an accident 
occurring in a state with legislation barring suits for wrongful death.  This was because ‘for our courts to be 
limited by the Massachusetts damage ceiling (at least to our own (residents)) is so completely contrary to 
our public policy that we should refuse to apply that part of the Massachusetts law’:  Kilberg v Northeast 
Airlines Inc (1961) 9 NY 2d 34, 172 NE 2d 526, Miller v Miller (1968) 22 NY 2d 12 and Tooker v Lopez 
 
The situation where the place of the wrong has little or no connection with the parties 
other than the fact that the incident occurred there, is the Achilles Heel of an inflexible 
application of the law of the place of the wrong.  Not surprisingly, it was the raison 
d’etre for the flexible exception recognized by Lord Wilberforce in Boys: 
 
The tort here was committed in Malta; it is actionable in this country.  But the 
law of Malta denies recovery of damages for pain and suffering.  Prima facie 
English law should do the same: if the parties were both Maltese residents it 
ought surely to do so; if the defendant were a Maltese resident the same result 
might follow.  But in a case such as the present, where neither party is a Maltese 
resident or citizen, further enquiry is needed rather than an automatic application 
of the rule.  The issue, whether this head of damage should be allowed, requires 
to be segregated from the rest of the case … related to the parties involved and 
their circumstances, and tested in relation to the policy of the local rule and of its 
application to these parties … So segregated, the issue is whether one British 
subject, resident in the United Kingdom, should be prevented from recovering … 
against another British subject … damages for pain and suffering which he 
cannot recover under the rule of the lex delicti.. Nothing suggests that the 
Maltese state has any interest in applying this rule to persons resident outside it, 
or in denying the application of the English rule to these parties.39
 
Surely, the general rule needs to be applied with some flexibility to deal with the issue 
whether the place of the wrong has no interest in its law being applied to the matter in 
dispute.  The need for such flexibility has been recognized in the United Kingdom, 
United States, New Zealand and Canada.  It is ridiculous for an Australian court to 
attempt to deny the need for such flexibility in the light of its recognition elsewhere.  
Such an approach might also ask whether the purpose behind the relevant rules would be 
furthered by their application in the particular case.  Various formulations of the 
suggested exception will now be considered. 
 
IV FLEXIBILITY - OTHER APPROACHES 
 
At the outset one should note that a variety of other approaches have been taken to 
resolve these difficult issues.  There is not as much consistency in the the use of terms, 
including the use of the terms ‘policy’, ‘proper law’, ‘interest analysis’, as one would like.  
Policy is used in different ways, sometimes as an exception to the general choice of law 
rule, sometimes in determining what the governing law should be in the first place.  
Sometimes interest analysis is seen as a distinct approach in itself, sometimes it is said to 
have been combined with a proper law approach.40  Though there may be some relation 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1969) 24 NY 2d 569.  Based on its comments in Renault, it seems the High Court might agree with this 
reasoning and apply it in an appropriate case.  On the other hand, if it continues to follow the Canadian line 
in this area, the Canadian court in Tolofson held that the limitation period of the law of the place of the 
wrong should not be rejected by the forum court on the basis of differing policy approaches to limitation 
questions. 
39 Chaplin v Boys [1971] AC 356, 392. 
40 An example of the latter is contained in the Australian Law Reform Commission’s Choice of Law Report 
(1992) para 6.65.  It recommended that ‘in interstate torts, the court take into account the purpose and 
and overlap between the two, for the purposes of this article (and for the purposes of 
conceptualizing the law in this area) the author thinks it better to discuss them separately. 
 
Proper Law of the Tort41
 
It is worth bearing in mind two points in this context: 
 
(a) that the original American Restatement in the area of conflict of laws 
called for the strict application of the law of the place of the wrong, only 
to be later replaced by the revised Restatement which calls for an interest-
weighing approach; and 
(b) the weighing of different interests accords with the accepted approach 
(including in Australia) of dealing with conflict issues in relation to 
contracts,42 thus providing a harmonized approach in the two areas of law.  
As James noted in relation to the Pfeiffer case, ‘it is unfortunate that the 
outcome of his case may have been different had it been framed in 
contract’.43 
                                                                                                                                                 
object of laws in deciding whether to replace the lex loci with the place of greater connection’.  Nygh also 
conflates interest analysis with proper law thus:  ‘The proper law of the tort approach employed in the 
United States depends upon interest analysis, rather than jurisdiction selecting choice of law rules’. Peter 
Nygh and Martin Davies Conflict of Laws in Australia 7th ed. (2002) 428-29.  Lord Wilberforce in Chaplin 
v Boys also related the two, as did Mason CJ in Breavington v Godleman. 
41 Morris, J H C ‘The Proper Law of the Tort’ (1951) 64 Harvard Law Review 881 
42 Merwin Pastoral Co Ltd v Moolpa Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 565, Rothwells Ltd (In Liq) v 
Connell (1993) 119 ALR 538.  See Lawrence Collins ‘Interaction Between Contract and Tort in the 
Conflict of Laws’ (1967) 16 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 103.  Brainerd Currie used some 
contracts examples to demonstrate interest analysis, e.g., the classic case of Milliken v Pratt (1878) 125 
Mass 374, involving a conflict between a Massachusetts law denying contractual capacity to married 
women, and the contrary Maine law, in an action by a Maine creditor against a Massachusetts married 
woman.  Currie saw this as involving a conflict between the policy of Maine law to protect the security of 
transactions and its intended beneficiaries to be resident Maine creditors, and the policy of Massachusetts, 
involving subordinating the policy of protecting the security of transactions to that of protecting married 
women against economic exploitation:  Currie Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963) 85. 
43 Elizabeth James ‘John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson:  The Certainty of Federal Choice of Law Rules for 
Intranational Torts:  Limitations, Implications and a Few Complications’ [2001] 23 Sydney Law Review 
145, 163.  The development of interest analysis has also been connected with legal realism theory:  see 
Michael Green ‘Legal Realism, Lex Fori and the Choice of Law Revolution’ (1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 
967; per Catherine Walsh ‘Territoriality and Choice of Law in the Supreme Court of Canada:  Applications 
in Product Liability Claims’ (1997) 76 Canadian Bar Review 91, 99 ‘Legal realism is widely acknowledged 
to be the impetus behind … a result-oriented jurisprudence under which the advancement of local policies 
and local concepts of justice guides choice of law adjudication in the same way as it does other categories 
of domestic adjudication’.     
 
As indicated, The American Restatement 2d, Conflict of Laws,44 embraces the theory of 
the ‘proper law of the tort’, or the tort law of the place with the closest connection with 
the parties (s145).   Section 145(2) of the Restatement specifies that the following are 
relevant in relation to tort choice of law questions: 
 
(i) the place where the injury occurred; 
(ii) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; 
(iii) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties; and 
(iv) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. 
 
The Restatement provides that the above ‘contacts’ are to be evaluated according to their 
relative importance with respect to the particular case.45  
 
The court in Pfeiffer in rejecting the proper law approach, noted that usually, when 
applying the test, the law of the forum had been adopted.46  There is some analogy with 
the concept of the proper law of the tort, and the application of the so-called flexible 
exception, in that some judges who apply the flexible exception approach apply the law 
of the place of the wrong as the primary rule, subject to an exception where another place 
is more closely connected with the parties and the events.47
 
However, issue may be taken with the High Court’s (very brief) review of the state of the 
United States authorities, and the conclusion drawn in the joint judgment in Pfeiffer that 
there is some trend back towards the application of the place of the wrong rather than the 
proper law.  The proper law of the tort remains the predominant rule used in the United 
States.48  The New York Court of Appeals decision of Babcock v Jackson, in which a 
balancing of interests proper law approach was taken, has never been overruled in that 
                                                 
44 American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971), an approach referred to with 
approval by Lord Wilberforce in Chaplin v Boys [1971] AC 356, 391-392. 
45 The first version of the Restatement favoured the law of the place of the wrong as the sole rule to be 
applied.  The court noted in Pfeiffer that the proper law approach had recently been criticized in the 
literature, and referred to suggestions the approach was inherently subjective rather than logical.  A critique 
of the approach is found in Adrian Briggs ‘Choice of Law in Tort and Delict’ (1995) Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 519. 
46 Pfeiffer, supra n 2 at 538. 
47 Lord Wilberforce in Chaplin, Mason CJ in Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41, and the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Babcock v Jackson (1963) 240 NYS 2d 742;  this issue will be considered 
in more detail later in the article.  Lord Wilberforce pointed out in Chaplin that the Second American 
Restatement formulation ‘has what is very necessary under a system of judge made law, the benefit of hard 
testing in concrete applications’.  Chaplin, supra n 44 at 391. 
48 Kirby J in Renault conceded this point, referring to States of the United States:  ‘Some jurisdictions that 
previously adhered to applying the law of the place of the wrong have tended more recently towards 
introducing greater flexibility in the rules … a judicial revolution (has) resulted in the widespread 
abandonment of the rule of the place of the wrong’. Supra n 2 at 536. (often after legislation had been 
introduced, and not without its own difficulties).  The United Kingdom’s Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 allows for a proper law exception to be invoked, whenever it would 
be ‘substantially more appropriate’ for the issue/s to be resolved by another law. 
State.49  A recent (1998) survey named only 11 of the United States as those applying a 
strict rule of the law of the place of the wrong.  United States commentators have viewed 
the position in the United States as follows: 
 
As the century draws to a close, the traditional theory in tort (favouring the place 
of the wrong) … finds itself in a very precarious state.  This assessment is based 
not simply on the relatively low number of states that still adhere to that theory, 
but also on the shallowness of their commitment to it.  Although the degree of 
commitment varies from state to state, it is fair to say that very few of these states 
are philosophically committed to the traditional theory … in some of these states, 
the (law of the place of the wrong) rules remain in place only because the highest 
court of the particular state has yet to encounter the “right case” for seriously 
considering their abandonment.50     
 
One Australian author has concluded that ‘clearly, the High Court has misconceived any 
revival of support for the lex loci in the United States’51.   
 
The United Kingdom’s torts choice of law legislation, the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, also may require an evaluation of connecting 
factors.  However, this is in a different way – where a primary rule is subject to 
displacement based on connecting factors, rather than in the Restatement, where the 
connecting factors comprise the general rule.  Its primary rule, that the law of the place of 
the wrong governs substantive issues, is subject to the application of another country’s 
law instead if, having considered the significance of the factors that connect a tort with 
the country in which it was committed, and the country factors that connect a tort with 
the other country, ‘it is substantially more appropriate for the applicable law to be the law 
of that other country’ for the purposes of determining the issues.52  The Australian Law 
                                                 
49 The approach commended itself to Mason CJ in Breavington, supra n 18 at 76. 
50 Symeon Symeonides ‘Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1998’ [1999] 47 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 328, 345; see generally Symeon Symeonides ‘Choice of Law in the American Courts in 
2001’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 1, 61 (Ten states continue to apply the law of the 
place of the wrong approach, with two of these applying a policy exception to avoid it in 2001.), Symeon 
Symeonides ‘Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996:  Tenth Annual Survey’ (1997) 45 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 447.  A leading authority on American choice of law, Weintraub, confirmed 
swift acceptance of the influential role of policy and interest analysis since cases in the 1950s and 60s:  
Russell Weintraub Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 3rd ed, (1986) 315-316.  The 1991 Supplement (66) 
confirms ‘The courts of thirty-five states .. have displaced the place of wrong rule as the sole choice of law 
rule for torts’.   One Australian author has concluded that ‘clearly, the High Court has misconceived any 
revival of support for the lex loci in the United States’:  Elizabeth James ‘John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson:  
The Certainty of Federal Choice of Law Rules for Intranational Torts:  Limitations, Implications and a Few 
Complications’ [2001] 23 Sydney Law Review 145, 158. 
51 Elizabeth James ‘John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson:  The Certainty of Federal Choice of Law Rules for 
Intranational Torts:  Limitations, Implications and a Few Complications’ [2001] 23 Sydney Law Review 
145, 158. 
52 Section 12(2); the Privy Council had concluded in Red Sea Insurance Co v Bouygues SA [1995] 1 AC 
190, 206 that ‘the law of England recognizes that a particular issue between the parties to litigation may be 
governed by the law of the country which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship 
with the occurrence and with the parties’. 
Reform Commission proposed a similar approach be adopted in Australia, and 
specifically rejected a proper law approach as the general choice of law rule.53   
 
New Zealand favours double actionability leading to the law of New Zealand as the 
substantive law of the forum to be applied subject to an exception if another country has 
the more significant relationship with the parties.  However, one wonders whether this is 
purely an adoption of the British approach, or a real commitment to double 
actionability.54
 
Interest Analysis 55  
 
Some in the United States have suggested that interest analysis may assist in the 
resolution of conflict of law issues in tort. 56  Though not immune from criticism,57 
                                                 
53 Australian Law Reform Commission Choice of Law (1992) No 58, Choice of Law Bill, clause 6(8). 
54 Baxter v RMC Group PLC (2003) NZLR 304, 318; in Richards and Others v McLean and Others [1973] 
1 NZLR 521, the judge seemed, with respect, reluctant to apply the law of the forum as the substantive law 
– Mahon J noted that ‘the application of English law as the dominant substantive law might not in many 
cases be objectionable having regard to the greater interest which the foreign country might have in the 
commission of the tort and its consequences’ at 524, but was ‘obliged to say that the first condition in 
Phillips v Eyre (requiring actionability according to the law of the forum) was on the balance of authority a 
choice of law rule and not a rule of jurisdiction’ at 525.  The judge did not say that he agreed with the 
approach; nor did he refer to much by way of support for the position.   See also Nicky Richardson ‘Double 
Actionability and the Choice of Law’ (2002) Hong Kong Law Journal 491.  
55 A leading American authority on choice of law rules, Russell Weintraub, wrote in his Commentary on 
the Conflict of Laws 3rd ed  (1986) 315-316.  that there had been a swift acceptance of the influential role of 
policy and interest analysis since the landmark decision in Schmidt v Driscoll Hotel (1957) 82 NW 2d 365.  
In that case, the court applied Minnesota law to an accident that took place in the State of Wisconsin.  
Minnesota law allowed a person injured as a result of the intoxication of another to sue for compensation 
the person who caused the intoxication, in this case the owners of a hotel in Minnesota.  Wisconsin law did 
not recognize such an action.  The parties involved were both residents of Minnesota, the defendant was 
licensed there, and was served alcohol there.  The court found that Minnesota law applied, with Minnesota 
having an interest in admonishing a liquor dealer whose violation of its statutes was the cause of injuries to 
a local resident, and in providing for a remedy for the injured person.  See also Robert Leflar, American 
Conflicts Law 3rd ed (1977) 195 setting out a number of choice-influencing factors, including predictability 
of results, maintenance of interstate and international order, simplification of the judicial task, advancement 
of the forum’s governmental interests, and application of the ‘better rule of law’ as factors influencing 
choice of law.   
56 Pioneering work on interest analysis is found in Brainerd Currie Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 
(1963) and Currie, B ‘Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws’ 
(1957-58) 10 Stanford Law Review 205.  For more recent writing on interest analysis, see Harold Korn  
‘The Choice of Law Revolution:  A Critique’ (1983) 83 Columbia Law Review 772, Russell Weintraub 
‘An Approach to Choice of Law That Focuses on Consequences’ (1993) 56 Alberta Law Review 701; 
Lawrence Kramer, L ‘Rethinking Choice of Law’ (1980) 80 Columbia Law Review 277 and Russell 
Weintraub ‘A Proposed Choice of Law Standard for International Products Liability’ (1990) 16 Brooking 
Journal of International Law 225. 
57 See, e.g., Carter, P B supra n 50 at 21.?? That author argues that interest analysis proceeds upon a 
‘fundamental misconception concerning the ultimate purpose of civil litigation.  That purpose is to do 
justice between the parties before the court’.  It may be arguable in response that a fundamental purpose of 
tort law, including choice of law rules in tort, is efficient loss distribution.  See  Fleming, J in Law of Torts 
9th ed (1998) which refers to a variety of purposes tort law serves, including deterrence, compensation and 
loss distribution.  At page 12 the learned author refers to a ‘growing trend towards loss distribution’.  See 
also Richard Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law 3rd ed (1986); William Landes and Richard Posner The 
including in particular Brilmayer,58 it is submitted that Australian courts may find interest 
analysis to be of assistance in this area in future years.59  There is no support for interest 
analysis in Australian case law, although the Australian Law Reform Commission 
supported considering the purpose or object of laws in applying the choice of law rules, 
which is considered to be similar to interest analysis.60  The Australian High Court made 
a cursory and arguably misleading reference to interest analysis in its Pfeiffer decision.61
 
A clear example of interest analysis occurred in the New York Court of Appeals decision 
in Babcock v Jackson, 62 to which reference has already been made.  The case involved 
two New York residents, one driving the other to Canada for the weekend.  While in 
Canada, the driver of the vehicle lost control and the car crashed.  The vehicle was 
registered and insured in New York, and was garaged there.  Both parties resided in New 
York, and their journey commenced, and would have ended, there.  In other words, the 
location of the accident was merely fortuitous, similar to the situation before the House of 
Lords in Chaplin v Boys, and before the High Court in Pfeiffer.  Ontario law would bar 
the action, New York law would allow it to be heard. 
 
The court noted the general rule that the question would be governed by the law of the 
place of the wrong, and outlined the chief advantages of the rule as they saw them, 
namely certainty, predictability, and ease of application, as the High Court did in Pfeiffer.  
However, they noted the rule would sometimes lead to unfair results.   
 
The court cited the Kilberg case, involving a New York resident being killed in a plane 
crash in Massachusetts.  Massachusetts law contained a ceiling on the damages claimable 
by the deceased’s family.  In refusing to apply the Massachusetts ceiling, the New York 
court explained that the random chance that the event occurred in Massachusetts did not 
give that State a controlling interest or concern in the amount of tort recovery, due to 
New York’s competing interest in providing full compensation for its residents or users 
of transportation facilities originating in New York.  The deceased had bought her ticket 
from the defendant in New York, and the trip originated there.63
                                                                                                                                                 
Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987), and Australian Law Reform Commission Choice of Law (1992) 
para 6.13 ‘The rule [double actionability] is out of touch with modern trends in tort law which are more 
concerned with the distribution of loss and risk than the allocation of responsibility’.   Some commentators 
suggest a stronger limit be placed on the application of forum law than interest analysis would allow. See, 
e.g., Simson, G J ‘State Autonomy in Choice of Law:  A Suggested Approach’ (1978) 52 Southern 
California Law Review 61; Silberman, L ‘Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation?:  Federal Choice of 
Law Constraints After Allstate Insurance Co v Hague’ (1981) 10 Hofstra Law Review 103. 
58 Lea Brilmayer ‘Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent’ (1980) 78 Michigan Law Review 
392, 398, 407 criticizing interest analysis (at least by Currie) as pro-resident, pro-forum and pro-recovery   
and leading to unpredictable results.  She implies interest analysis does not genuinely seek to reflect the 
wishes or interests of legislatures. 
59 Mason CJ referred to the debate in Breavington supra n 18 at 82. 
60 Choice of Law (1992) para 6.65 ‘It is recommended that in interstate torts, the court take into account the 
purpose and object of laws in deciding whether to replace the lex loci with the place of greater connection’. 
61 Pfeiffer, supra n 2 at 537. The Court stated only that ‘interest analysis has been doubted’ citing curiously 
as support for the proposition a case commonly referred to as an example of an interest analysis approach 
(Alaska Packers) and then the work of Brainerd Currie, also an advocate of the approach. 
62 (1963) 12 NY 2d 473, 191 NE 2d 279. 
63 Kilberg v Northeast Airlines Inc (1961) 172 NE 2d 526, 527-528. 
 
Turning its mind to this case, the court adopted a similar interest-weighing approach, in 
deciding whether to apply New York or Ontarian law.64  It found New York’s concern in 
the matter was unquestionably the greater and more direct, and the interest of Ontario at 
best minimal.  New York was the home of the driver and passenger, the place where the 
car was kept and insured, and where the journey began and was designed to end.  
Ontario’s only connection was the ‘purely adventitious circumstance’ that the accident 
occurred there.  Ontario had no conceivable interest in denying such a remedy in a suit 
between New York litigants for injuries suffered in Ontario because of conduct tortious 
under Ontario law.  Their law was designed to prevent fraudulent insurance claims.  
There was no reason to depart from the New York policy of requiring a tortfeasor to 
compensate a person they have injured by their negligence.65   
 
As well as currently being absent from Australian law, there is little reference to interest 
analysis being applied, at least explicitly, in the Canadian or New Zealand case law.66  It 
is submitted, with respect, that the jurisprudence of both countries would benefit from a 
consideration of such factors, at least in some cases.67
 
V  CONDUCT REGULATION AND LOSS DISTRIBUTION 
 
United States courts have recognized that different choice of law rules can apply to 
different issues put before the court for consideration.  Specifically, they have recognized 
a distinction between what is known as ‘conduct regulation’ and ‘loss distribution’.  
Different rules apply to these categories.  Conduct regulation tends to be governed by the 
law of the place of the wrong, either with or without resort to interest analysis.  
Nevertheless, interest analysis would be readily applied to conduct regulation.  A 
jurisdiction has a clear and strong interest in regulating conduct within its territory.  It 
would be very difficult for another jurisdiction to claim it has a stronger interest in 
regulating conduct within another jurisdiction, than the jurisdiction itself would have.  As 
                                                 
64 The approach taken is similar to that of the Second Restatement, which was in draft form at the time of 
the decision.  For an excellent account of the important impact the Babcock decision has had on American 
jurisprudence, see Harold Korn ‘The Choice of Law Revolution – A Critique’ (1983) 83 Columbia Law 
Review 772. 
65 However, the result would be different if one of the parties resided in the law of the place of the wrong.  
This was confirmed in Neumeier v Kuehner (1972) 286 NE 2d 454, 456 where the wife of a Canadian 
resident sued after her husband was killed while a passenger in a car driven by a New York resident in 
Canada.  The court applied Canadian law to the issue, noting that although New York has a deep interest in 
protecting its own residents, even when they are traveling interstate, it has no legitimate interest in ignoring 
the public policy of a foreign jurisdiction, Ontario in this case, and in protecting the plaintiff passenger 
living and injured there from legislation obviously addressed to a resident traveling in a vehicle within its 
borders. 
66 ‘There is no indication that the policies underlying the substantive laws of potentially interested states 
were examined, nor were the factual contacts weighed.’  Elsabe Schoeman, ‘Tort Choice of Law in New 
Zealand: Recommendations for Reform’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 537. 
67 Schoeman suggests that in the New Zealand context, interest analysis might be particularly useful where 
it is impossible to determine the proper law of the tort objectively on the basis of a centre of gravity 
approach – ‘in such cases it will be necessary to determine which jurisdiction has the greater interest in the 
application of its law on the basis of the policy or policies underlying the law.’ Ibid, 560. 
the court in Babcock v Jackson said, ‘where the defendant’s exercise of due care in the 
operation of his vehicle is in issue, the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful 
conduct occurred will usually have a predominant, if not exclusive, concern … (because 
of) that jurisdiction’s interest in regulating conduct within its borders … it would be 
almost unthinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of some other place’.68
 
So recently in Matson by Kehoe v Anctil,69 the issue was whether the parents of a child 
injured in a Vermont car accident were guilty of contributory negligence.  At the time of 
the accident, the plaintiff’s mother was holding the child in her lap in the front passenger 
seat.  The question of contributory negligence would be answered differently according 
to which law applied, the defendant being from Quebec.  The court applied the law of the 
place of the wrong, Vermont, to the issue.  The conclusion was that ‘because both the 
conduct and the injury occurred in Vermont … [that state] … had a strong and obvious 
interest in regulating the conduct of persons within its territory and in providing redress 
for injuries that occurred there’.70
 
Loss distribution is seen as something to which interest analysis (together, in some cases, 
with a proper law approach) is applied.  Given that conduct regulation and loss 
distribution are decided by different rules, different law can apply to them.  This is why 
in the 1997 Matson case the law of Vermont applied to the question of contributory 
negligence, but in the 1998 Matson case when the issue arose as to whether the defendant 
truck driver was an independent contractor or the agent of another defendant, the court 
viewed this as a loss distribution issue and applied Quebec law to the question.  Quebec 
law had the greater interest in and closer connection with the issue because the truck 
driver and the corporation were both from that jurisdiction.71
 
So for example in Babcock v Jackson itself, the court found that the law of the forum 
should apply to the questions of liability because that jurisdiction had a closer interest in 
the issue than the alternative place of the wrong.  The policy underlying the law of the 
place of the wrong would not be disturbed, the court found, if the law of the forum 
governed liability compensation issues. 
 
While Babcock v Jackson dealt with a situation where the court applied interest analysis 
to find that the law of the forum governed compensation issues, the court can also apply 
interest analysis to find that the law of the place of the wrong governs these issues.  A 
                                                 
68 (483), 191 NE 2d 284. 
69 (1997) 979 F Supp 1031. 
70 Ibid, 1035.  Similarly in Pittman v Maldania Inc (2001) WL 1221704, the defendant operated a water ski 
rental office on the Delaware side of that State’s border with Maryland.  The law of both states provided it 
was unlawful to rent skis to a person under 16, but the law of Delaware (only) also required that the person 
renting to produce a valid driver’s licence.  The plaintiff, aged 14, obtained skis after misrepresenting his 
age.  He was injured while riding the skis in Maryland.  The court found the law of the place of the wrong 
(in this case Delaware, where the skis were hired) should apply.  The Delaware law reflected a ‘clear policy 
against renting skis to people who are unable to produce a valid driver’s licence … [as] part of a 
comprehensive statute on boating safety … [and] a state statute regulating conduct should be enforced 
throughout the State’ 
71 Matson v Anctil (1998) 7 F Supp 2d 423. 
good example of this situation is Myers v Langlois.72  There both of the relevant parties 
lived in a jurisdiction (Quebec) barring the plaintiff’s action.  The accident occurred in a 
state (Vermont) allowing the plaintiff’s action.  The action was brought in a Vermont 
court.  That court concluded that the law of Quebec should apply, based on interest 
analysis.  As the judges said:  
 
Since the choice of law issue presented relates to allocation of post-event losses, 
not regulation of conduct, the goals of Vermont’s system would not be realized 
by permitting the actions to go forward here.  Quebec has demonstrated strong 
policy concerns by enacting a comprehensive automobile insurance act that 
provides no-fault compensation and allocates loss between Quebec residents.  
We therefore conclude that Quebec’s significant interest in maintaining its no-
fault insurance scheme outweigh the parties’ contacts with Vermont.73
 
It should be pointed out the writer is not aware of any reference to the distinction between 
conduct regulation and loss distribution in any of the Australian, New Zealand or British 
conflicts jurisprudence. 74   However, the joint judgment in Renault contains the 
interesting aspect that the judges expressly reserved the question whether questions on 
kind, and quantification of, damage should be governed by the law of the place of the 
wrong.75  This is interesting because the High Court has confirmed in cases such as 
Stevens v Head 76  that it views questions as to the heads of damage that may be 
recoverable as a matter of substance that should, according to the general rule adopted by 
the High Court in Pfeiffer and Renault, be resolved according to the law of the place of 
the wrong.  Yet the High Court in Renault leaves open the question of which law to apply.  
This leaves open the possibility that in future cases, the High Court might adopt the 
distinction, in applying its conflict of law rules in torts cases, between issues of conduct 
regulation and loss distribution.  In particular, it might confirm that the law of the place 
of the wrong should apply to questions of conduct regulation, but the issue of loss 
distribution might need a more flexible approach. 
 
This distinction between conduct regulation and loss distribution makes strong analytical 
sense to the writer.  There is no warrant for departing from the law of the place of the 
wrong regarding issues of conduct regulation.  That jurisdiction has a right to regulate 
conduct that occurs within its boundaries.  The rule meets the reasonable expectation of 
the parties that if they enter another jurisdiction, their conduct is subject to regulation by 
the government of that jurisdiction.  The rule is simple to apply, certain, and unlikely to 
lead to anomalies. 
 
                                                 
72 (1998) 721 A 2d 129. 
73 Ibid, 132. 
74 However in Boys, some of the judges saw no difficulty with segregating issues, and applying different 
laws to them – for example, Lord Wilberforce ‘This issue, whether this head of damage should be allowed, 
requires to be segregated from the rest of the case … and tested in relation to the policy of the local rule 
and of its application to these parties so circumstanced’ 389. 
75 Supra n 1 at 520. 
76 (1992) 176 CLR 433. 
Compared with the issue of conduct regulation, loss distribution is more difficult.  No 
general answer can be provided as to the correct approach, given the multitude of 
possibilities that may present themselves.  However, in the simplest case where both 
parties are resident in one country/jurisdiction (A) and are involved in an accident in 
country B, it is surely true to say that country B has no real interest in determining the 
issue of the respective liabilities of the parties.  The policy of that country’s liability laws 
will not be thwarted if A’s laws are applied to resolve the liability issues, in the case 
where both parties to the litigation are from that country.  This situation is common in 
conflicts cases, including the facts raised in Chaplin, Pfeiffer and Babcock.   
 
As James suggested, in reference to the Pfeiffer decision, the court should have 
considered whether ‘the New South Wales legislature had any real interest in the 
application of its workplace scheme to an ACT employer’s liability’.77  Similarly, one 
could ask whether Malta had any interest in the application of its compensation laws to 
decide liability between British residents (the Chaplin situation), or whether the province 
of Ontario had any interest in the application of its compensation laws to decide liability 
between New York residents (the Babcock situation). 
 
One might make the same comment in relation to the recent decision in Union Shipping 
New Zealand Ltd v Morgan.78  There the plaintiff, a New Zealand resident working for a 
shipping company incorporated in New Zealand, was injured while the ship was 
unloading coal in a New South Wales port.  He sued his employer at common law.  New 
Zealand had a no-fault compensation scheme that would have prevented him bringing a 
common law action in that country.  The New South Wales Court of Appeal found that 
New South Wales law applied to the action.  Again, one might ask the question whether 
New South Wales had any interest in applying its tort law (allowing a common law 
action) to the claim, based as it was against a New Zealand employer, who had 
contributed to a compensation scheme for employees in that country.79  Is it anomalous 
that had the plaintiff been unloading the coal in New Zealand, or in non-Australian 
territorial waters, his claim may not have been able to be brought? 
 
It is submitted that the rule decided upon by the High Court in Pfeiffer (confirmed in 
Renault), while having the advantage of simplicity and certainty, cannot address this 
situation in an acceptable way – where the law of the place of the wrong is in a sense 
fortuitous, and the parties have no other connection with this place other than that fact.  
                                                 
77 Elizabeth James ‘John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson:  The Certainty of Federal Choice of Law Rules for 
Intranational Torts:  Limitations, Implications and a Few Complications’ [2001] 23 Sydney Law Review 
145, 159. 
78 [2002] 54 NSWLR 690. 
79 It is submitted a correct application of interest analysis to this factual scenario would find New South 
Wales had no interest in the litigation.  With respect, it is not to the point to conclude, as Heydon JA did in 
Union Shipping, that ‘it cannot be said that New South Wales, whose citizens were receiving the coal, had 
no concern with the presence of the vessel’. Ibid, 731.  If this was a purported application of interest 
analysis, it is submitted with respect not to be an accurate one.  His Honour went on to say that ‘it is 
difficult to see how anything in the nature of an onerous or disruptive burden would be created by applying 
New South Wales law’.  Ibid.  With respect, this is not an accepted test for deciding on questions of choice 
of law. 
This problem applies both in relation to international torts, and in torts involving more 
than one Australian jurisdiction.   
 
Other possibilities may present themselves.  It may be that one of the parties may live in 
the jurisdiction where the accident occurred, with the other living in the forum 
jurisdiction.  Some United States courts would solve this problem by applying an interest 
analysis to the question of loss distribution.  The High Court would apparently apply the 
law of the place of the wrong, inflexibly if dealing with an interstate conflict.  The result 
would be more interesting if it were dealing with an international conflict.  It outlined in 
Renault that in such cases the law of the place of the wrong would continue to apply.  It 
may adopt an exception based on public policy considerations.  But what of the High 
Court’s reservations in Renault on the distinction it agreed to it Pfeiffer between matters 
of substance and matters of procedure, and particularly its comments that it reserves the 
question whether issues regarding quantification of damages is in fact a matter for the 
place of the wrong, in relation to international cases?80
 
Is this far from the approach of the United States which reserves the issue of loss 
distribution to the place with the closer connection with the parties, involving questions 
of policy?  It was suggested earlier that the High Court in Renault may have been 
indicating it would apply questions of policy in its classification of issues, including 
quantification of damages, as either substantive or procedural.   
 
The matter must remain for the moment one of conjecture only, but it is quite conceivable 
given the Court’s comments in Renault that one day, it may (as a matter of policy) 
determine issues of quantification of damages, in relation to an action brought in 
Australia based on a tort committed overseas, according to the law of the forum 
(Australia).  The policy reason for this may be that the foreign jurisdiction does not 
recognize heads of damage that Australian law does (the situation in Chaplin), together 
with (or as an alternative) the argument that deciding issues of loss distribution by the 
law of the forum (Australian law) does not, as a matter of international comity, interfere 
with the sovereignty, public policy or interest of the foreign jurisdiction in the matter at 
hand.  If the Court were to take this step, it would be justified in doing so by referring to 
the United States distinction between conduct regulation and loss distribution. 
 
VI  CONCLUSION 
 
It is submitted that the Australian High Court has generally taken a very positive step 
recently in stating the law of the place of the wrong as the only law to be applied in 
relation to torts involving more than one state, and as (at least) the primary law to be 
applied in relation to international torts.   
 
The author prefers this approach to the continuing adherence to the double actionability 
rule evident in the New Zealand law.  There is surely no justification for continuing to 
                                                 
80 Compare the approach of the Supreme Court of California in Tucci v Club Mediterranee SA (2001) 107 
Cal Rptr 2d 401, where the court applied the law of the place of the wrong, the Dominican Republic, to 
determine what remedies were available to the plaintiff, rather than the law of the forum 
require that the law of the forum provide recovery in the matter, a la Phillips v Eyre.  It is 
submitted to be an anachronistic rule, overturned by legislation or case law in most 
jurisdictions.  New Zealand is one of the few to continue to adhere to it.  Of course, that 
fact alone is not grounds for it to be overturned, but when many other countries recognize 
the previous law is no longer desirable, if it ever was, it surely justifies a rethink.  The 
Phillips approach may be based on an overly-parochial approach to questions of choice 
of law, a disdain for legal systems other than the one the judge belongs to, or a difficulty 
in obtaining the substantive law of other countries.  Surely, none of these justifications 
can withstand serious scrutiny in 2005. 
 
However, in future the High Court may need to consider increasing flexibility in the 
application of its choice of law rules, as at least Kirby J on the current bench has 
conceded.  Just as New Zealand has become isolated in its adherence to double 
actionability, Australia has become isolated in its rejection of a flexible exception to 
choice of law questions.  It is an isolation which surely cannot continue.  The article has 
pointed out that facts like those in Kuwait Airways would strain the High Court’s newly-
adopted test and hopefully make it reconsider its antipathy towards a flexible exception. 
 
There is a rich North American jurisprudence in relation to questions of policy (albeit in a 
different context), including the possibility of answering different questions that may 
arise in a conflicts case by applying different laws, and interest analysis to weigh up 
competing interests in particular cases.  Such an approach also commended itself to the 
British legislators.   
 
The author has concluded against creating any exception to choice of law rules based 
only on ‘policy’.  As has been seen, the concept is fraught with uncertainty.  It has been 
used in different ways by different courts.  The record of the High Court in various fields 
in applying the concept of ‘policy’ has not been an envious one, creating uncertainty, and 
perhaps masking views and considerations that are not always expressed clearly.  The 
author would prefer a more explicit and transparent solution. 
 
The conclusion reached by the writer is that matters of conduct regulation should be 
regulated by the law of the place of the wrong, without exception.  This rule should apply 
both in interstate and international torts cases.  This result is generally consistent with the 
High Court’s stated preference in Pfeiffer for rules in this area to be as simple as possible, 
consistent, and certain.  It meets legitimate expectations that a person who is present 
within a jurisdiction submits to that jurisdiction’s conduct regulation rules.  That 
jurisdiction has a strong interest in developing and enforcing conduct standards that apply 
to all within its borders. 
 
However, it is concluded that the question of loss distribution is a more vexed one.  There 
is much to be said for the argument that the law of the place of the wrong should not 
apply to this issue in the case where that country’s government (and/or law) has no 
interest in the allocation of responsibility between the parties.  This may be because the 
parties do not reside in that jurisdiction, have no interest in it, and where the policy intent 
of that country’s relevant laws would not be thwarted by their non-application to the loss 
allocation decision in the case at hand.81  It is conceded here that it may be a difficult 
matter of evidence to determine in all cases the policy intent of the relevant legislatures.  
However, this should at least be a genuine exercise, and not a sham to justify applying the 
law of the forum, to take into account Brilmayer’s forum-bias concerns with interest 
analysis. 
 
As a result, it is suggested that where the issue is one of loss distribution, the court should 
not automatically apply the law of the place of the wrong to resolve the issue (current 
Australian position), nor generally apply the law of the forum (current New Zealand 
position).  Perhaps this could be the starting point, or initial presumption, as currently 
occurs in New Zealand.  The question should be answered by considering interest 
analysis, and whether the policy intent of each of the relevant legislatures in the tort field 
would be thwarted if their law did not apply to resolve the issue.  This change to the 
current Australian position could be achieved through development by the courts, but 
perhaps the preferable approach is to legislate the exception to clarify the issue, as the 
United Kingdom did.  The legislation could clarify the general rule subject to 
displacement, precisely which considerations were relevant in applying the interest 
analysis approach to loss distribution, and what kind of evidence might be appropriate to 
determine the issue.  This is seen as preferable to a vague judicially crafted exception 
based on ‘policy’.   
 
It is also suggested that New Zealand should abandon its double actionability test, in 
favour of primacy being given to the law of the place of the wrong, subject to an 
exception in the area of loss distribution, along the lines (broadly) of the position in the 
United Kingdom, but allowing for a different approach to the issues of conduct regulation 
(inflexible) and loss distribution (flexible).  Thus the author contends that an Australian 
court and New Zealand court should adopt similar positions on this difficult issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
81 This is acknowledged as a hybrid of interest analysis and proper law approach, an approach certainly not 
without support in the literature, see supra n 58. 
